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5:	Leadership	and	Crises:	incubation,	emergence,	and	transitions	
	
	
	Denis	Fischbacher-Smith	University	of	Glasgow			
OUTLINE	OF	THE	CHAPTER	
	This	chapter:		
• Investigates	leadership	in	crisis	conditions	using	the	lens	of	a	chronology	from	incubation,	emergence	and	transitions	in	a	crisis	lifecycle	
• Notes	how	leadership	can	itself	contribute	t	the	generation	of	crisis	events	
• Describes	 and	 assesses	 various	models	 in	 the	 development	 and	 handling	 of	crises				
	
Introduction	
	 The	relationships	that	exist	between	the	generation	of	‘crises’	and	the	role	that	‘leadership’	 plays	 in	 the	 process	 can	 be	 considered	 at	 multiple	 points	 in	 the	incubation,	 escalation,	 and	 aftermath	of	 a	 crisis	 event.	The	onset	 of	 a	 crisis	 has	 the	effect	 of	 accentuating	 the	 search	 for	 effective	 leadership	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 task	demands	 of	 the	 event.	 Inevitably,	 there	 is	 also	 immediate,	 heightened	 and	 intense	scrutiny	on	the	leadership	within	the	organisation	and	a	search	for	culpability	around	causality.	At	the	same	time,	crisis	conditions	can	also	generate	opportunities	for	new	leaders	 to	 emerge	 and	 to	 do	 so	 at	 different	 levels	 within	 the	 organisation.	 The	leadership	 skills	 and	 capabilities	 needed	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 a	 crisis	 are	 also	dependent	 on	 the	 environmental	 context	 in	 which	 the	 crisis	 occurs	 as	 well	 as	 the	dynamic	capabilities	of	others	who	work	within	the	organisation.		There	is	also	a	darker	side	to	the	process	of	crisis	leadership	and	this	becomes	manifest	in	the	ways	in	which	leadership	practices	can	lead	to	the	generation	of	crisis	events.	For	some,	the	combination	of	strong	and	charismatic	leadership	brings	with	it	the	risk	of	shaping	the	core	beliefs	and	values	of	the	organisation	and	restricting	the	
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creativity	and	challenge	that	comes	from	a	more	democratic	process	(Hanlon,	2016).	For	others,	such	strong	leadership	is	potentially	important	in	allowing	for	an	effective	response	 to	crisis	 (Bligh,	Kohles,	&	Meindl,	2004;	 Judd,	2000;	Pillai,	1996;	Probst	&	Raisch,	 2005).	 The	 role	 of	 leadership	 within	 crisis	 does	 not	 fall	 neatly	 into	 such	 a	binary	 relationship	 and	 it	 is	 important	 to	 see	 it	 within	 a	 holistic	 context	 that	embraces	 the	actions	of	 leaders,	 the	behaviours	of	 followers	and	hostile	actors,	and	the	environmental	context	in	which	such	interactions	occur	(Boin	&	Paul	't,	2003).				 	The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 consider	 the	 relationships	 that	 exist	 between	leadership	and	the	onset	and	escalation	of	crisis.	The	core	argument	developed	here	is	that	organisational	leaders	can	play	a	significant	role	in	the	development	of	a	crisis	as	well	as	being	critical	in	the	management	of	the	task	demands	that	it	generates.	In	particular,	 the	 actions	 of	 leaders	 can	 create	 the	 conditions	 that	 can	 cause	 the	organisation	 to	 fail	 (Reason,	 1990b,	 1997;	Turner,	 1976,	 1978,	 1994),	 especially	 as	the	organisation	moves	away	 from	 its	designed-for	 state	 into	a	potentially	unstable	one	(Fischbacher-Smith,	2014;	Hodge	&	Coronado,	2007;	Tsoukas,	1999).	As	part	of	this	 discussion,	 the	 chapter	 considers	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 crisis	 and	 illustrates	 how	 its	various	 stages	 generate	 task	 demands	 for	 those	 in	 managerial	 and	 leadership	positions	 to	 deal	 with.	 It	 also	 considers	 how	 the	 actions	 of	 senior	 members	 of	 an	organisation	 can	 create	 the	 conditions	 that	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 a	 crisis,	 especially	 in	terms	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 transitions	 that	 take	 place	 within	 the	 crisis	 generation	process.	 Thus,	 leaders	 can	 become	 the	 “authors	 of	 their	 own	misfortune”	 (Smith	&	Fischbacher,	 2009)	 as	 they	 generate	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 very	 crises	 that	 they	subsequently	have	to	manage.	The	double-edged	nature	of	this	process	also	generates	questions	about	the	potentially	destructive	nature	of	leadership	and	how,	under	some	conditions,	those	negative	characteristics	may	prove	to	be	of	value	in	dealing	with	the	task	demands	of	a	crisis	event.	The	approach	taken	in	this	chapter	 is	 framed	within	
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the	 systems	 management	 literature,	 which	 both	 reflects	 some	 of	 the	 dominant	approaches	that	have	been	taken	towards	crisis	management	and	also	allows	for	the	relationships	 between	 leadership	 and	 crisis	management	 to	 be	 framed	 in	 a	 holistic	manner.	Finally,	 the	 chapter	will	 consider	 the	processes	by	which	 toxic	 leaders	 can	play	in	the	incubation	processes	associated	with	failure	across	the	three	main	stages	associated	 with	 a	 crisis	 -	 the	 crisis	 of	 management,	 the	 operational	 crisis,	 and	 the	crisis	of	legitimation	(Smith,	1990a,	1995).		
Leadership	and	crisis	management	as	strategic	issues	Crises	would	appear	to	be	a	common	aspect	of	organisational	life	and	have	the	potential	 to	 cause	 considerable	 harm	 to	 the	 organisation	 (Mitroff,	 Pauchant,	 &	Shrivastava,	 1988;	 Mitroff,	 Shrivastava,	 &	 Udwadia,	 1987).	 This	 damage	 can	 occur	across	 a	 range	 of	 organisational	 activities	 and	 may	 extend	 into	 the	 organisation’s	wider	value	chain	(James,	Wooten,	&	Dushek,	2011;	Uta	&	Stan,	2011).	Despite	their	prominence	the	study	of	crisis	 is	generally	an	under-represented	 in	 the	curricula	of	business	 education	 and	 leadership	 programmes	 (Fischbacher-Smith	&	 Fischbacher-Smith,	 2013;	 Lalonde	 &	 Roux-Dufort,	 2013;	 Powley	 &	 Taylor,	 2014).	 	 At	 its	 core,	effective	 crisis	management	 is	 a	 strategic	 process	 and	one	 in	which	 leadership	 and	management	(as	both	a	function	and	a	process)	are	central	components	(Greening	&	Johnson,	1996;	Mitroff,	Pauchant,	Finney,	&	Pearson,	1989;	Mitroff	et	al.,	1988;	Smith,	1992).	 The	 relationships	 between	 decision-making	 and	 crisis	 are	 well-established,	both	in	terms	of	the	responses	made	to	crisis	events	and	also	in	terms	of	the	ways	in	which	 decisions	 contribute	 to	 crisis	 incubation.	 Thus,	 in	 both	 the	 creation	 of,	 and	response	 to	 crisis,	 the	 role	 of	 leadership	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 an	 important	 factor	(Barton,	 2008;	 Kapucu	 &	 Van	Wart,	 2008).	 Strong	 and	 effective	 leadership	 can	 be	instrumental	in	ensuring	that	an	organisation	deals	with	the	task	demands	of	a	crisis	
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and	 recovers	 from	 the	 damage	 that	 such	 an	 event	 can	 cause	 whereas	 weak	 and	ineffectual	 leadership	 can	 have	 the	 opposite	 effect.	 Whilst	 such	 a	 statement	 is	axiomatic,	 it	masks	some	of	 the	complex	dynamics	associated	with	crisis	 incubation	and	 leadership.	 It	 is	 the	 case,	 for	 example,	 that	 ‘strong	 leadership’	 can	 lead	 an	organisation,	or	even	a	nation	state,	 into	crisis.	 Illustrations	of	 this	exist	 throughout	history	where	leaders	have	been	able	to	manipulate	others	to	follow	their	destructive	lead	(Post,	1991;	Rees,	2012;	Rosenthal	&	Pittinsky,	2006).		Clearly	extreme	despotic	behaviour	is	thankfully	rare,	however	it	has,	and	still	does,	manifest	 itself	 in	a	more	muted	 form	across	 political	 regimes	 and	 geographical	 areas	 (Allum,	 2011;	Herbert,	2011;	Shaw,	Erickson,	&	Nassirzadeh,	2014).		The	 relationships	 between	 failure,	 crisis,	 and	 leadership	 are,	 therefore,	complex,	multi-level	issues	(Yammarino	&	Dansereau,	2002,	2008).	However,	they	do	not	easily	 lend	themselves	to	empirical	research	before	a	crisis	event	occurs	and	so	much	 of	 the	 work	 in	 this	 area	 has	 been	 retrospective.	 Organisations	 are,	 perhaps	naturally,	reluctant	to	allow	for	the	personality	testing	of	senior	teams	prior	to	a	crisis	and	once	a	crisis	has	begun	there	are	few	opportunities	to	assess	the	importance	of	specific	leadership	characteristics	in	shaping	the	complexion	of	the	event.	Most	work	is,	therefore,	carried	out	after	the	event	and	is	subject	to	post-crisis	bias,	constrained	information	 flows,	and	the	process	of	organisational	scapegoating	that	often	occurs.	Despite	 these	 constraints,	 there	 are	 some	 studies	 that	 have	 sought	 to	 identify	 the	characteristics	of	toxic	 leadership	and	done	so	to	provide	an	alternative	view	to	the	dominant	 literature	 that	 focuses	on	 the	positive	aspects	of	 the	 leadership	construct	(Kellerman,	2004;	Tourish,	2013).		Within	an	organisational	context,	research	on	the	darker	aspects	of	leadership	has	 focused	 on	 the	 so-called	 dark	 triad	 of	 narcissism,	 psychopathy,	 and	Machiavellianism	(Padilla,	Hogan,	&	Kaiser,	2007;	Paulhus	&	Williams,	2002)	and	the	
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potential	that	these	psychological	factors	can	have	on	organisational	performance.	In	particular,	 the	 processes	 around	 organisational	 psychopathy	 and	 narcissism	 have	been	areas	that	have	attracted	considerable	attention	(Babiak	&	Hare,	2006;	Boddy,	2011,	 2014;	 Campbell,	 Hoffman,	 Campbell,	 &	 Marchisio,	 2011;	 Marshall,	 Ashleigh,	Baden,	Ojiako,	&	Guidi,	2014;	Pech	&	Slade,	2007;	Rosenthal	&	Pittinsky,	2006;	Stein,	2013).	The	examples	of	Enron,	along	with	a	range	of	behaviours	that	occurred	across	a	 number	 of	 financial	 organisations	 prior	 to	 the	 2008	 crisis,	 have	 been	 used	 to	illustrate	 how	 such	 dark	 leadership	 behaviours	 can	 lead	 organisations	 into	 crisis	(Aebi,	Sabato,	&	Schmid,	2012;	Boddy,	2011;	Earle,	2009;	Stein,	2013;	Stein	&	Pinto,	2011).			If	we	accept	the	premise	that	leaders	can	shape	the	nature	of	an	organisation’s	culture,	affect	its	strategic	direction,	and	enhance	the	capabilities	of	the	organisation	to	 perform	 against	 its	 task	 demands,	 then	 it	 also	 follows	 that	 weak,	 corrupt,	 or	dysfunctional	 leaders	 can	 affect	 the	 organisation	 in	 a	 negative	 manner	 (Turner,	1994).	This	negative	aspect	of	leadership	and	management	actions	and	interventions	sits	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 processes	 around	 the	 incubation	 of	 failure	 conditions	within	organisations	 (Reason,	 1997;	 Turner,	 1976,	 1978)	 in	 which	 leadership	 can	 be	 a	potent	factor	in	shaping	the	potential	for	crisis.	However,	this	is	not	a	simple	binary	relationship	between	‘good’	and	‘bad’	leadership	practices	and	the	onset	of	crisis,	and	we	need	to	think	of	the	interactions	between	these	elements	in	terms	of	a	spectrum	of	behaviours	in	which	the	organisation’s	environment	is	also	a	critical	factor	in	shaping	the	 development	 of	 a	 crisis.	 Early	 research	 in	 the	 field,	 for	 example,	 has	 also	highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 mental	 state	 of	 individuals	 (both	 insiders	 and	external	 agents)	 in	 causing	 harm,	 the	 role	 taken	 by	 leaders	 in	 generating	vulnerabilities	in	control	systems,	and	the	role	that	such	leaders	can	play	in	shaping	the	response	to	a	crisis	(both	 in	an	operational	sense	and	in	terms	of	 learning	from	
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the	event)	(Kovoor-Misara,	1996;	Kovoor-Misra,	1995;	Reason,	1990b;	Smith,	1995).		Similarly,	the	configuration	and	leadership	of	crisis	management	teams	to	cope	with	the	task	demands	of	a	crisis	event	are	also	 important	ways	 in	which	 leadership	can	contribute	to	the	escalation	(or	control)	of	a	crisis	(Smart	&	Vertinsky,	1977;	Smith,	2000a,	2004).	Thus,	leadership	can	be	seen	to	be	a	central	component	of	a	crisis	from	its	 incubation,	 through	 realisation,	 and	 towards	 recovery	 (Barton,	 2008;	 Sipika	 &	Smith,	 1993;	 Smith	 &	 Sipika,	 1993;	 Turner,	 1978).	 However,	 there	 has	 been	 a	tendency	to	valorise	 leadership’s	role	 in	this	process	rather	than	to	consider	how	it	might	 be	 a	 root	 causal	 factor	within	 the	 generation	 of	 a	 crisis	 and	 our	 aim	 here	 is	explore	the	darker	side	of	leadership’s	role	in	the	process.	In	order	to	explore	this,	we	need	to	set	out	the	nature	of	the	crisis	management	processes	and	use	it	as	a	means	of	situating	 the	 role	 that	 leadership	 can	play	 in	both	 the	 creation	of,	 and	 response	 to,	crisis	events		
The	nature	of	Crisis		 The	 relationships	 between	 the	 development	 of	 crisis	 conditions	 within	organisations	 and	 the	 leadership	 styles	 of	 those	 who	 manage	 those	 organisations	have	a	 long	history	within	 the	academic	 literature	 (Mitroff	 et	 al.,	 1989;	Pauchant	&	Mitroff,	1992;	Turner,	1976,	1978,	1994).	 	 In	many	respects,	there	is	an	assumption	that	those	managers	who	preside	over	an	organisation	that	is	 in	a	state	of	crisis	are	invariably	responsible	 for	 the	creation	of	 that	situation	 -	 leaders,	and	 the	processes	around	the	leadership	that	they	provide,	are	typically	seen	as	having	characteristics	that	help	to	generate	the	crisis	(Turner,	1994).	Of	course,	failures	are	not	always	the	function	of	the	actions	of	a	single	individual	and	there	is	a	range	of	cultural	and	other	socio-technical	 systems	elements	 that	play	a	 role	 in	 this	process	 (Gigerenzer,	2002;	Perrow,	 1984;	Reason,	 1987,	 1997;	 Sagan,	 1993;	Tenner,	 1996).	 Leadership	 can	be	
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seen,	therefore,	as	both	a	cause	and	a	solution	to	the	generation	and	management	of	a	crisis.	It	has	been	seen	as	a	dominant	element	in	the	development	of	failure	due	to	its	widespread	 influence	 in	 shaping	 the	 development	 of	 an	 organisation’s	 culture,	 the	recruitment	 strategies	 that	 are	 in	 place	 within	 it,	 along	 with	 the	 potentially	 toxic	components	of	 leadership	personality	and	managerial	style	(Fraher,	2014;	Pauchant	&	Mitroff,	1992;	Tavanti,	2011;	Tourish,	2013).		If	managers	are	found	to	recruit	like-minded	people,	sycophants,	or	those	that	make	weak	managers	feel	comfortable,	then	the	potential	for	creating	weak	links	within	an	organisation's	management	structure	is	high	(South	&	Matejka,	1990).	Ultimately,	the	result	can	be	the	generation	of	a	crisis	prone	culture	in	which	the	leadership	style	of	individuals	can	prove	to	be	a	significant	factor	 in	 shaping	 the	 pre-conditions	 for	 failure	 (Mitroff	 et	 al.,	 1989;	 Mitroff	 et	 al.,	1988;	Reason,	1997;	Turner,	1978).	In	addition,	the	self-reinforcing	processes	around	groupthink	 can	 also	 serve	 to	 generate	 a	 cultural	 context	 in	which	 constrained	 and	potentially	 weak	 decision-making	 can	 remain	 unchallenged	 by	 those	 within	 the	decision-making	 team	(Herek,	 Janis,	&	Huth,	1989;	 Janis,	1982;	Smith,	2000b).	Such	processes	have	been	 seen	 to	 lie	 at	 the	 core	 of	 a	 number	of	 significant	 crisis	 events	occuring	across	a	range	of	organisational	settings	(Esser	&	Lindoerfer,	1989;	Garnett	&	 Kouzmin,	 2009;	 Hermann	 &	 Dayton,	 2009;	 Moorhead,	 Ference,	 &	 Neck,	 1991;	Sipika	&	Smith,	1993;	Weick,	1990,	1993).				 			 Within	the	broader	‘crisis	management’	literature,	there	has	been	considerable	debate	 concerning	 both	 the	 nature	 of	 crisis	 as	 a	 construct	 and	 the	 various	 stages	through	 which	 a	 crisis	 develops	 (Allison,	 1969;	 Burnett,	 1998;	 Eichengreen,	 2003;	Evans	&	Elphick,	2005;	Quillinan	et	al.,	2009).	Much	of	the	research	within	the	area	of	crisis	 management	 has	 been	 carried	 out	 across	 a	 range	 of	 disciplines	 including:	political	 science,	economics,	 communication	studies,	 and	business	and	management	
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and	the	focus	here	is	primarily	on	the	latter	body	of	work.	Even	within	the	business	and	management	literature,	there	is	considerable	diversity	around	the	ways	in	which	the	various	stages	of	a	crisis	are	defined,	 identified	and	developed	(Pearson	&	Clair,	1998;	Pollard	&	Hotho,	2006;	Roux-Dufort,	2007;	Wilding	&	Paraskevas,	2006).	There	are	also	different	definitions	of	the	nature	of	a	crisis,	and	this	can	also	lead	to	issues	around	 interpretation.	 	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 present	 discussion,	 a	 crisis	will	 be	considered	as:	“a	damaging	event,	or	series	of	events,	that	display	emergent	properties	which	exceed	 an	 organisation’s	 abilities	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 task	 demands	 that	 it	generates	and	has	implications	that	can	effect	a	considerable	proportion	of	the	organisation	 as	well	 as	 other	bodies.	The	damage	 that	 can	be	 caused	 can	be	physical,	 financial,	 or	 reputational	 in	 its	 scope.	 In	 addition,	 crises	 will	 have	both	a	spatial	and	temporal	dimension	and	will	invariably	occur	within	a	sense	of	“place”.	Crises	will	normally	be	“triggered”	by	an	incident	or	another	set	of	circumstances	 (these	 can	 be	 internal	 or	 external	 to	 the	 organisation),	 that	exposes	 the	 inherent	 vulnerability	 that	 has	 been	 embedded	 within	 the	“system”	over	time”.		(Smith,	2006)	p.	7.			The	key	dimensions	of	this	particular	definition	of	crisis	are	the	emergent	nature	of	crisis	 events,	 the	 challenges	 that	 such	 emergence	 can	 generate	 for	 the	 dynamic	capabilities	 required	 of	 organisations,	 and	 the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 incubation	 of	 a	range	 of	 pre-cursor	 elements	 of	 failure	 within	 the	 organisation’s	 routine	 practices	(Perrow,	1984;	Perrow,	2004).	It	highlights	the	need	to	take	a	holistic	perspective	on	the	process	and	it	recognises	the	importance	of	both	internal	and	external	actors	 in	triggering	 and	 shaping	 the	 crisis	 as	 well	 as	 the	 environmental	 context	 in	 which	 it	occurs.	 	 The	 implications	 for	 leadership	 processes	 within	 this	 context	 are	considerable	 therefore,	 especially	 if	 we	 frame	 the	 various	 stages	 of	 a	 crisis	 as	extending	beyond	a	highly	damaging	event	to	include	both	the	incubation	processes	that	 create	 the	conditions	 for	 failure	and	 the	organisational	 learning	 (or	 reframing)	that	takes	place	in	response	to	the	event	(Smith	&	Elliott,	2007).		
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	 Within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 definition	 outlined	 above,	 the	 framework	 of	 crisis	used	here	is	the	three-stage	model	developed	by	Smith	and	colleagues	(Smith,	1990a,	1995;	 Smith	 &	 Sipika,	 1993).	 	 The	 first	 stage	 in	 this	 framework	 addresses	 how	organisations	 can	 incubate	 the	 potential	 for	 crisis	 events	 through	 the	 range	 of	processes	 outlined	 by	 Turner	 that	 concern	 the	 failures	 of	 managerial	 foresight	(Turner,	 1976,	 1978,	 1994).	 	 He	 argued	 that	 a	 series	 of	 factors	 result	 in	 the	minimisation	of	organisational	concerns	around	potential	threats	and	these	include:	rigidities	 in	 the	 perceptions	 of	 key	 decision-makers;	 processes	 by	 which	 decision-makers	become	distracted	by	decoy	phenomena	(that	is,	potential	threats	that	divert	the	 attention	 of	 managers	 away	 from	 other	 viable	 threats);	 problems	 around	information	 provision	 and	 interpretation	 that	 prevent	 effective	 sensemaking	concerning	 the	 threats	 (this	 includes	 the	 reluctance	 to	 respond	 to	 external	challenges);	 and	 a	 series	 of	 issues	 around	 conforming	 to	 regulatory	 requirements	(Turner,	 1976,	 1978,	 1994).	 	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 elements,	 Reason	 (1987,	 1990b,	1997)	has	highlighted	the	role	 that	both	 latent	and	active	human	errors	can	play	 in	the	 generation	of	 gaps	 in	 organisational	 controls	 and	 these	 can	 subsequently	 allow	initial	 failures	 to	escalate	 in	an	uncontrolled	manner.	This	 is	especially	problematic	when	 the	 system	 in	 which	 these	 factors	 are	 contextualised	 as	 being	 both	 “tightly	coupled”	 and	 “interactively	 complex”	 (Perrow,	 1984).	 	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 speed	 of	interaction	between	elements	of	the	system	(tight	coupling)	ensures	that	the	failure	migrates	 through	 the	 system	 quickly	 and	 the	 interactions	 between	 those	 elements	(interactive	 complexity),	 allows	 the	 failure	 to	 extend	 beyond	 the	 initial	 triggering	event.	The	complexity	within	the	system	also	allows	for	the	generation	of	emergent	conditions	in	which	events	occur	that	are	beyond	the	designed-for	parameters	of	the	system	 (Smith,	 2005).	 The	 actions	 that	 are	 taken	 in	 response	 to	 these	 emergent	conditions	 can	 then	 create	 new	 problems	 that	 lie	 outside	 of	 both	 the	 control	
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parameters	 that	 are	 in	 place	 as	well	 as	 the	 experience	 base	 of	 those	who	 lead	 the	organisation.		A	casual	glance	at	the	media	coverage	of	business	performance	will	invariably	highlight	a	range	of	issues	concerning	the	practices	around	organisational	leadership,	the	assumptions	that	such	leaders	often	make	around	the	validity	of	the	controls	that	are	in	place	to	manage	risk,	and	the	relationships	that	both	sets	of	processes	can	have	on	 the	 incubation	of	 crisis	potential.	A	 recent	example	 that	 illustrates	 the	nature	of	the	 problem	 is	 the	 Volkswagen	 emissions	 crisis.	 The	 issue	 emerged	 in	 September	2015,	when	it	was	revealed	that	Volkswagen	cars	had	been	fitted	with	software	that	masked	 the	 pollution	 emission	 characteristics	 of	 its	 engines	 when	 under	 test	conditions	and	the	revelation	pushed	the	company	into	a	state	of	crisis	(Kretchmer,	2015).	 	 The	 manufacturer's	 chief	 executive	 resigned	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	allegations	and	the	company	was	forced	to	make	several	high	profile	apologies	about	the	incident	across	a	number	of	countries	(Anon,	2015b;	Kretchmer,	2015).	However	in	 October	 2015,	 a	 senior	manager	 stated	 in	 evidence	 to	 the	 US	 congress	 that	 the	problem	may	have	been	the	result	of	two,	apparently	rogue,	software	engineers	and	that	there	was	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	senior	management	anywhere	within	the	company	had	authorised	such	actions	(Anon,	2015b).	If	this	is	the	case,	then	it	raises	some	concerns	about	 the	 level	of	control	 that	managers	have	over	 the	behaviour	of	staff	 and	 the	 quality	 assurance	 processes	 that	 are	 supposedly	 in	 place.	 It	 is	 also	somewhat	worrying	 that	 two	employees	 could	generate	 such	a	 significant	 crisis	 for	the	 company	 and	 do	 so	without	 detection.	 Given	 that	 it	 has	 emerged	 that	 between	two	and	 ten	 individuals	may	 face	charges	over	 the	scandal	 (Anon,	2015a)	 then	 this	seems	to	be	a	potentially	widespread	issue.	However,	 it	does	raise	a	question	about	the	controls	 in	place	to	prevent	such	rogue	actions	 from	occurring.	 If	we	accept	 the	organisation’s	defence	 that	 the	 crisis	 arose	due	 to	 the	actions	of	 a	 small	number	of	
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individuals,	then	it	serves	to	highlight	a	range	of	processes	around	the	management	of	 insider	 threats,	 the	culture	of	 the	organisation,	and	 the	processes	around	quality	assurance	controls.	It	seems	likely	that	the	scale	of	the	crisis	will	increase,	especially	as,	 at	 the	 time	of	writing,	 it	 seems	 to	be	 escalating	 to	 encompass	petrol	 engines	 as	well	 as	 diesel	 (Paton,	 2015).	 Leadership	 is	 clearly	 required	within	 the	 company	 to	deal	with	the	demands	of	the	event,	repair	the	organisation’s	reputation,	and	restore	shareholder	value.	If	the	tampering	issues	were	not	enough	to	cause	reputational	damage	to	the	industry,	it	has	also	been	suggested	that	a	number	of	car	manufacturers	knew	of	the	damaging	health	 effects	 of	 diesel	 vehicles	 for	 some	 time	but	 had	 sought	 to	 supress	them	 (Kenber	 &	 Mostrous,	 2015).	 Another	 damaging	 revelation	 in	 this	 regard	concerned	the	links	that	VW	had	with	scientific	research	groups	who	were	funded	by	the	company	and	who	acted	to	play	down	the	effects	of	diesel	engines	on	health	and	the	 environment	 (Mostrous	 &	 Kenber,	 2015).	 It	 also	 highlights	 the	 ways	 in	 which	those	 in	 positions	 of	 power	 are	 able	 to	 shape	 the	 debate	 by	 controlling	 the	acceptability	of	certain	forms	of	knowledge	and	evidence	within	such	debates	(Smith,	1990b).	 The	 VW	 example	 illustrates	 the	 complex	 relationships	 that	 exist	 between	leadership	 processes	 and	 the	 incubation,	 generation,	 and	 escalation	 of	 crises.	 The	case	also	highlights	the	ways	in	which	crises	can	be	incubated	as	part	of	the	routine	activities	 of	 organisations	 and	 how	 organisational	 misbehaviours	 can	 arise	 in	apparent	(but	misguided)	support	of	the	perceived	organisational	objectives		 A	 range	 of	 factors,	 in	 addition	 to	 those	 around	 incubation,	 can	 also	 serve	 to	move	 the	 organisation	 away	 from	 the	 system’s	 designed-for	 state.	 For	 example,	Radell	 (1992)	 argues	 that	 organisations	 can	 engage	 in	 the	process	 of	 “storming”	 in	which	the	critical	phases	of	the	design	process	for	a	system	are	compressed	in	such	a	manner	 that	 they	 overlap.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 problems	 which	
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should	be	identified	in	the	early	phases	of	a	tranformation	process	are	only	identified	when	 the	change	processes	 is	being	 implemented.	This	 is	 akin	 to	 the	embedding	of	“error	cost”	within	the	system	and	in	a	way	that	may	only	become	apparent	further	down	 the	 timeline	 (Collingridge,	 1992).	 As	 with	 the	 erosion	 of	 organisational	controls,	many	of	these	problems	may	only	become	apparent	when	the	system	moves	towards	the	point	of	failure.	The	inability	to	identify	early	warnings	and	weak	signals	is	a	key	element	of	the	crisis	of	management	phase.	In	part,	this	can	be	explained	by	the	 ways	 that	 organisations	 collect	 and	 manage	 information.	 Seidl	 argues	 that	organisations	 develop	 ‘structures	 of	 observation’	 that	 shape	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 it	collects	 and	 utilises	 knowledge	 around	 systems	 performance	 (Seidl,	 2007).	 If	organisations	 fail	 to	 recognise	 the	 complexity	 that	 is	 inherent	 in	 the	 system	 then	 it	can	 serve	 to	 inhibit	 their	 abilities	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 problems	 that	 they	 face.	Underlying	this	is	the	view	that:	“Knowledge	is	situated,	circumstantial	and	context	driven.	Acknowledgement	of	 complexity	 leads	 a	 reduction	 in	 confidence	 in	 knowledge.	 By	 denying	 or	repressing	 complexity,	 one	 can	 seemingly	 boost	 ‘confidence’	 in	 knowing”	 -	(Letiche,	2009),	p.	59.			For	 the	 insecure	 leader,	 this	might	 be	 a	 compelling	 approach	 as	 it	 allows	 them	 to	maintain	the	façade	of	being	in	control	by	simplifying	the	nature	of	the	problems	that	they	face.	The	result	of	these	factors	is	the	creation	of	a	vulnerable	organisation	that	does	not	address	the	problems	that	it	has	to	deal	with.				 Figure	1	seeks	to	conceptualise	these	processes	by	outlining	the	key	elements	of	 the	 crisis	 of	management	phase	 and	 its	 evolution	 into	 an	operational	 crisis.	This	evolution	 is	 shown	as	a	continuous	process	and	 it	 is	 the	contention	here	 that	 these	two	 phases	 are	 intrinsically	 linked.	 It	 is	 also	 contended	 that	 leadership	 plays	 a	significant	 role	 across	 this	 space.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 leadership	 plays	 a	 role	 in	
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shaping	 the	 processes	 around	 the	 development	 of	 a	 system’s	 designed-for	 state	(shown	at	(a))	as	well	as	helping	to	shape	the	range	of	processes	that	can	lead	to	the	generation	of	emergent	conditions	 that	have	the	potential	 to	move	the	system	from	(a)	 to	(b).	The	processes	 identified	at	 (a)	represent	a	 level	of	complexity	within	 the	operation	of	the	system	that	can	begin	to	generate	the	emergent	conditions	that	move	it	beyond	its	designed-for	state	towards	a	new	operational	state.	As	controls	are	put	in	place	 for	 the	designed-for	 state,	 then	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 there	will	 be	no	 controls	 in	place	 for	 the	 emergent	 conditions	 shown	 at	 (b).	 Similarly,	 if	 the	 organisation’s	structures	 of	 observation	 are	 constrained	 then	 managers	 will	 not	 actively	 seek	 to	identify	issues	that	sit	outside	of	the	accepted	performance	criteria.	Put	another	way,	we	 manage	 what	 choose	 to	 measure.	 The	 result	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 set	 of	vulnerabilities	 within	 the	 system	 and	 a	 series	 of	 fractures	 in	 controls.	 These	vulnerabilities	can	remain	dormant	until	a	trigger	event	exposes	them	and	allows	the	crisis	to	emerge,	thereby	moving	the	organisation	to	another	systems	state.	This	shift	from	one	 system	state	 to	 another	 can	 take	multiple	 forms	and	 is	dependent	on	 the	particular	characteristics	of	the	system,	the	actions	of	those	who	work	within	it,	and	the	environment	in	which	it	operates.	However,	it	may	also	be	shaped	by	the	actions	of	those	who	lead	the	organisation	and	who	generate	the	latent	conditions	(Reason,	1990a,	1997)	that	create	vulnerabilities	within	the	system.	This	is	a	point	that	will	be	returned	to	in	more	detail	later.														
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Figure	1:	The	crisis	of	management	phase	
			 A	 trigger	 event	 (at	 (c))	 can	 expose	 these	 latent	 conditions	 and	 incubated	elements	of	failure	and	move	the	system	into	an	uncontrolled	state	in	which	the	task	demands	that	are	generated	sit	outside	of	 the	 ‘normal’	control	requirements	 for	the	system.	 As	 the	 crisis	 moves	 into	 its	 operational	 stage	 (shown	 at	 (d)),	 then	 the	decisions	taken	by	those	who	are	responsible	for	trying	to	control	the	event	have	the	potential	 to	 generate	 further	 emergent	 conditions	 that	 will	 continue	 to	 move	 the	system	 into	 a	 chaotic	 state.	 Given	 that	many	 contingency	 plans	will	 be	 designed	 to	cope	with	 the	parameters	around	 the	designed-for	 state	and	 the	associated	 failures	that	 seem	 likely	within	 that	 context,	 then	 these	emergent	 conditions	will	 invariably	not	be	covered	by	that	contingency	planning	process.	Indeed,	one	might	argue	that	if	the	 leadership	 of	 the	 organisation	were	 aware	 of	 these	 potential	 failures	 then	 they	would	 be	 honour-bound	 to	 try	 and	mitigate	 that	 potential	 for	 failure.	 The	 result	 is	
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that	 the	 task	 demands	 generated	by	 a	 crisis	will	 invariably	 exceed	 the	 contingency	limits	that	are	in	place	and	so	the	organisation	will	have	to	adapt	to	these	additional	task	demands	(shown	at	(e)).			
Moving	away	from	equilibrium		 Taken	together,	this	body	of	work	explains	how	and	why	an	organisation	may	move	away	from	its	designed-for	state	 to	a	different	equilibrium	state,	and	do	so	 in	such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 organisation	 remains	 unaware	 of	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 systems	state.	This	notion	of	a	shift	away	from	the	designed-for	state	has	been	developed	by	a	number	of	authors	and	the	interaction	between	environmental	shifts	and	the	internal	procedures	at	work	in	the	organisation	have	been	used	as	a	means	of	explaining	the	processes	that	can	lead	to	a	move	from	equilibrium	and,	ultimately,	to	failure	(Hodge	&	Coronado,	 2007;	Tsoukas,	 1999).	 Tsoukas	 (1999),	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 there	are	 four	major	 factors	 that	are	 important	 in	 shaping	 the	 ‘texture	of	organizing’	 and	these	 are	 action	 (which	 is	 often	 determined	 at	 distance),	 processes	 around	dematerialisation,	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 social	 reflexivity	 is	 carried	 out,	 and	 the	mediated	 nature	 of	 communication.	 Hodge	 and	 Coronado	 (2007)	 frame	 these	 four	issues	 –	 economy,	 action,	 perception,	 and	 social	 relations	 –	within	 the	 setting	 of	 a	three	 systems	 state	which	moves	 from	 a	 ‘close	 to	 equilibrium’	 state	 towards	 a	 ‘far	from	 equilibrium’	 state	 (see	 figure	 2).	 	 As	 the	 organisation	 moves	 away	 from	 its	designed-for	 equilibrium	 state1,	 the	 interactions	 between	 the	 four	 key	 elements	become	ever	more	complex	and	the	cognitive	distance	between	the	elements	can	be	seen	to	become	extended.	Put	another	way,	we	can	see	the	task	demands	increasing	the	further	the	organisation	moves	from	its	equilibrium	(or	designed-for)	state.	These	
                                                
1 It is also possible for the organisation to achieve a new stable equilibrium state that is some distance from 
its designed-for state and which has vulnerabilities in its control parameters. The system appears to operate 
‘normally’ but these latent conditions have the potential to cause it to fail if the system is subject to a shock 
event/trigger. 
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shifts	 are	 dependent	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 environment,	 the	 capabilities	 of	 the	organisation	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 task	 demands	 that	 are	 generated	 by	 environmental	changes,	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 organisational	 members	 (both	 leaders	 and	 other	colleagues)	in	ensuring	that	the	organisation	does	not	spiral	into	a	state	of	crisis	(that	is,	a	far	from	equilibrium	state).	The	implication	is	that	as	the	system	moves	further	from	its	equilibrium	state,	then	the	abilities	of	leaders	and	management	processes	to	deal	with	 the	 task	demands	 associated	with	 each	 of	 the	 four	 elements	will	 become	impaired.	 	 The	 challenge	 for	 leadership	 within	 the	 organisation	 is	 to	 manage	 the	transitions	between	these	systems	states	in	such	a	way	that	the	organisation	does	not	move	 into	 a	 state	 of	 crisis.	 Clearly,	 this	 is	 a	 challenging	 process	 and	 Hodge	 and	Coronado	argue	that:	“In	 practice	 transitions	 take	 place	 unevenly,	 following	 a	 spiral	 rather	 than	crossing	discrete	circles,	moving	backwards	as	well	as	forwards,	across	spaces	rather	 than	 lines.	 Yet	 the	 circles	 have	 a	 heuristic	 value,	 representing	transitions	 from	 one	 condition	 to	 the	 next,	 marking	 distinct	 conditions	 and	logics”	-	(Hodge	&	Coronado,	2007),	p.10.			It	 is	 this	 turbulence	within	 the	 transitions	 to	 crisis	 that	 generates	 the	 potential	 for	additional	 emergent	 conditions	as	 the	 interactions	between	elements	of	 the	 system	can	 create	 challenges	 that	 move	 it	 further	 beyond	 its	 initial	 control	 parameters.		Effective	 leadership	 is	 essential	 to	 managing	 the	 task	 demands	 around	 these	transitional	 processes,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 likely	 that	 ineffective	 (or	 dysfunctional)	leadership	will	be	critical	in	impairing	their	abilities	to	do	so.		One	element	of	Hodge	and	Coronado’s	conceptualisation	of	the	transition	to	crisis	concerns	the	three	stages	through	which	the	system	moves	and	these	can	be	seen	to	reflect	the	views	expressed	elsewhere	 around	 the	 nature	 of	 environmental	 shifts.	 Within	 systems	 biology,	 for	example,	Kaufmann	and	colleagues	have	conceptualised	the	environment	as	existing	in	three	states	–	ordered,	complex,	and	chaotic	–	in	which	the	challenges	presented	to	organisms	 that	 seek	 to	 function	 in	 that	 environment	 increase	 across	 this	 “fitness	
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landscape”	(Kauffman,	1993;	Kauffman	&	Johnsen,	1991).	For	the	ordered	state,	 the	parameters	within	 the	environment	are	generally	 stable	and	well	understood.	Here	the	 routine	 ways	 of	 operating	 are	 sufficient	 to	 ensure	 a	 satisfactory	 level	 of	performance.	 As	 the	 environment	 becomes	more	 challenging	 then	 the	 organisation	can	be	seen	to	be	operating	within	a	complex	systems	state.	Here	the	task	demands	generated	 by	 the	 environment	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 moving	 the	 system	 beyond	 its	normal	 operating	 conditions.	 Decisions	 taken	 here,	 where	 the	 uncertainty	 around	systems	 performance	 is	 invariably	 higher,	 have	 the	 potential	 of	 shifting	 the	organisation	 towards	 a	 more	 chaotic,	 or	 crisis,	 state.	 Here,	 both	 uncertainty	 and	emergence	 are	 high	 and	 the	 need	 for	 an	 effective	 response	 by	 decision-makers	 is	essential	 in	preventing	organisational	collapse.	 In	such	a	chaotic	state,	 the	extent	of	the	 uncertainty	 facing	 decision-makers	 is	 high	 and	 the	 knowledge	 base	 needed	 to	cope	with	 high	 levels	 of	 emergent	 conditions	 is	 also	 problematic.	 The	 lack	 of	 prior	experience	of	 these	conditions	generates	challenges	 for	decision-makers,	and	this	 is	often	 compounded	by	 the	high	 levels	 of	 ambiguity	 and	 codification	 associated	with	information	 flows	under	 crisis	 conditions	 (Child,	 Ihrig,	&	Merali,	 2014;	 Cohendet	&	Steinmueller,	2000;	Ulmer	&	Sellnow,	2000).	The	four	elements	shown	in	Figure	2	do	not	have	sufficient	granularity	within	them	to	serve	as	an	explanatory	mechanism	for	the	move	towards	crisis,	but	the	conceptualisation	does	offer	a	starting	point	to	help	frame	the	transition	to	crisis	that	was	shown	in	Figure	1.							
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Figure	2	–	Hodge	and	Coronado’s	conceptualisation	of	a	move	away	from	equilibrium	
	Source:	(Hodge	&	Coronado,	2007),	p.	9		 Figure	 3	 expands	 on	 the	 initial	 conceptualisation	 set	 out	 by	 Hodge	 and	Coronado	 and	 provides	 a	 more	 robust	 means	 by	 which	 we	 can	 frame	 the	 role	 of	leadership	 in	 terms	of	 the	 transitions	within	 crisis	management.	Perception	and	 its	relationship	 to	 action	 remains	 a	 core	 axis	 within	 the	 transition	 to	 crisis	 but	 it	 is	expanded	 to	 include	 the	role	of	 core	beliefs,	values	and	assumptions	 in	shaping	 the	nature	 of	 decision-making	 at	 both	 an	 operational	 and	 strategic	 level.	 These	 issues	have	 been	 highlighted	 across	 the	 crisis	 management	 literature	 as	 being	 important	elements	 in	the	emergence	of	crises	(Mitroff	et	al.,	1988;	Pascale,	1990;	Pauchant	&	Mitroff,	 1992).	 Central	 to	 this	 relationship	 is	 the	way	 in	which	 those	who	 lead	 and	influence	the	organisation’s	behaviours	are	able	to	incorporate	both	risk	(as	relatively	well	known	and	understood	probabilities	and	consequences)	and	uncertainty	(where	ambiguity	 is	 high)	 into	 their	decision-making	processes.	As	 the	organisation	moves	from	 its	 designed-for	 (equilibrium)	 state	 towards	 a	 more	 chaotic	 (far	 from	
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equilibrium)	state,	 then	the	extent	of	both	risk	and	uncertainty	within	the	decision-making	axis	will	invariably	increase.	It	is	also	possible	for	the	organisation	to	move	to	a	 new	 equilibrium	 state	 in	 which	 the	 incubation	 of	 failure	 potential	 makes	 that	equilibrium	essentially	unstable	and	it	will	move	rapidly	to	a	chaotic	state	if	a	suitable	triggering	 event	 occurs.	 	 Both	 the	 economy	 and	 social	 relations	 elements	 of	Hodge	and	 Cororado’s	 framework	 have	 also	 been	 expanded.	 The	 economy	 label	 has	 been	replaced	 with	 production,	 consumption,	 and	 control	 as	 this	 provides	 for	 greater	granularity	around	issues	relating	to	systems	design	(storming,	coupling,	interactive	complexity),	the	processes	around	control	(latent	and	active	human	errors,	paradigm	blindness,	 weak	 signal	 detection,	 structures	 of	 observation),	 and	 the	 role	 that	consumption	 can	 play	 in	 driving	 organisational	 behaviours.	 Finally,	 social	 relations	(which	 are	 seen	 here	 to	 include	 processes	 around	 communication	 and	 information	sharing)	 are	 expanded	 to	 include	 the	 role	of	networks	 (as	 conduits	 for	 information	sharing)	 and	 structures	 (including	 pre-crisis	 structures	 and	 temporary	 crisis	management	teams).		
Figure	3	–	Risk	and	uncertainty	within	crisis	transformations		
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The	 resultant	 framework	 is	 one	 in	 which	 leadership	 processes	 operate	 and	where	the	positive	and	negative	aspects	of	leadership	characteristics,	the	interactions	with	others	in	the	organisation,	and	the	environmental	challenges,	all	play	a	key	role	in	shaping	the	onset	of,	and	response	to	crisis.	As	the	environment	moves	to	a	more	complex	 state,	 the	 dynamism	 within	 it	 generates	 additional	 task	 demands.	 This	 is	partly	 a	 function	of	 the	 emergence	 that	 arises	 out	 of	 the	new	 interactions	between	elements	of	the	system	but	is	also	a	function	of	the	difficulties	involved	in	managing	the	 increased	 information	 flows	 and	 the	 associated	 impact	 that	 this	 can	 have	 on	sensemaking	processes.	 	Boisot	has	argued	 that	 the	more	 complex	and	codified	 the	information	is,	the	more	steps	are	needed	to	decode	it	(Boisot,	1995;	Boisot	&	Child,	1999;	 Boisot	 &	 Cox,	 1999),	 and	 this	 has	 considerable	 implications	 for	 the	 ways	 in	which	 organisations	 respond	 to	 the	 demands	 generated	 in	 both	 a	 complex	 and	 a	chaotic	 environmental	 setting.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 crisis	management	 teams	 can	 play	 an	important	 role	 in	 shaping	 organisational	 performance	 under	 conditions	 of	uncertainty.	 Effective	 crisis	 teams	 remain	 an	 important	 element	 in	 the	 process	 of	crisis	management	 and	 they	 have	 to	 be	 trained	 and	 developed	 prior	 to	 any	 actual	crisis	occurring	if	they	are	to	deliver	a	level	of	performance	in	the	face	of	such	threats	(Smart	&	Vertinsky,	1977;	Smith,	2000a).		Again,	leadership	has	an	important	role	to	play	within	 the	 selection	 and	development	of	 those	 teams	and	weak	managers	 and	leaders	 can	 create	 ineffectual	 crisis	 teams	 (Smith,	 2004;	 South	 &	 Matejka,	 1990).	Again,	 this	 interaction	 between	 leaders	 and	 followers	 within	 a	 crisis	 context	 has	synergies	with	the	transformational	approaches	taken	towards	leadership.		The	final	area	of	the	crisis	management	framework	used	here	concerns	what	Smith	(1990a,	1995)	has	 termed	the	“crisis	of	 legitimation”.	Leadership	can	play	an	important	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 post-crisis	 learning	 processes	 that	 the	 organisation	engages	 in	 (and	 which	 feeds	 back	 into	 the	 crisis	 of	 management	 phase)	 and	 also	
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shapes	 the	 organisation’s	 performance	 in	 the	 turnaround	 process	 (Elliott	 &	 Smith,	2006;	 Elliott,	 Smith,	 &	 McGuinness,	 2000;	 Smith	 &	 Elliott,	 2007).	 For	 our	 present	purposes,	this	phase	will	not	be	considered	in	detail.		The	characteristics	of	those	who	lead	the	organisation,	their	interactions	with	others,	 and	 the	abilities	 that	 they	have	 to	 respond	dynamically	 to	 the	environment,		will	be	important	in	both	shaping	the	move	towards	a	more	complex/chaotic	systems	state	as	well	as	determining	how	the	organisation	responds	 to	 the	 task	demands	of	those	 environmental	 conditions.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 considers	 the	potential	role	that	leadership	can	play	within	the	context	of	a	crisis.	In	many	respects,	this	discussion	is	exploratory	and	seeks	to	raise	issues	that	require	further	research	and	attention	from	both	leadership	and	crisis	management	research.	In	particular,	the	synergies	that	exist	between	these	two	bodies	of	work	have	considerable	potential	to	help	develop	our	understanding	of	 the	 transition	 to	crisis	and	 the	contribution	 that	leadership	can	make	within	that	process.				
Dark	Leadership	and	Leadership	in	Crisis	-	two	sides	of	the	same	coin	or	different	
currencies?	
	 “Hubris	 is	 almost	 an	 occupational	 hazard	 for	 leading	 politicians,	 as	 it	 is	 for	leaders	 in	 other	 fields,	 such	 as	 the	military	 and	business,	 for	 it	 feeds	 off	 the	isolation	that	often	builds	up	around	such	leaders……a	point	often	comes	when	such	 individuals	 are	 no	 longer	 living	 in	 the	 same	world	 as	 the	 organisation	they	lead”	–	(Owen,	2012)	p.	xvi		 The	ways	 in	which	 leaders	 of	 organisations	 can	 become	 isolated	 and	 out	 of	touch	with	others	has	been	the	subject	of	a	considerable	body	of	research	 in	recent	years	(Hiller	&	Hambrick,	2005;	Kellerman,	2004;	Li	&	Tang,	2010;	Lipman-Blument,	2005).	A	similarly	constrained	form	of	thinking	amongst	leaders	has	been	a	dominant	theme	within	the	broad	body	of	the	crisis	management	literature	(Sayegh,	Anthony,	&	Perrewé,	2004;	Turner,	1994;	Vaughan,	1997).	 	This	 isolation	of	 leaders,	along	with	
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the	 presence	 of	 a	 number	 of	 potentially	 damaging	 psychological	 issues	 and	organisational	 misbehaviours,	 may	 serve	 to	 move	 an	 organisation	 into	 a	 state	 of	instability	 (and	 ultimately	 to	 crisis)	 and	 do	 so	 almost	 independently	 of	 the	environmental	 challenges	 that	 the	 organisation	 faces	 (Boddy,	 2011;	 Boddy,	Ladyshewsky,	 &	 Galvin,	 2010a;	 Owen,	 2012).	 	 More	 recently,	 the	 importance	 of	followers	 in	 shaping	 the	 behaviours	 of	 those	 who	 lead	 the	 organisation	 has	 also	emerged	as	an	important	issue	(Kellerman,	2008),	as	has	the	situational	context	and	associated	 underlying	 processes	 that	 can	 serve	 to	 shape	 leadership	 behaviours	(Haslam,	Reicher,	&	Platow,	2011).		Haslam	 and	 colleagues	 raise	 a	 number	 of	 challenges	 that	 they	 frame	within	what	 they	 term	 the	 new	psychology	 of	 leadership.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 is	 that	 the	we	need	 to	 contextualise	 leadership	 in	 a	 non-individualistic	 manner	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	move	 away	 from	 the	 habit	 of	 valorising	 individuals	 (Haslam	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	implication	here	is	that	there	is	no	single	profile	that	typifies	the	ideal	(crisis)	leader	but	that	the	characteristics	of	the	individual	need	to	be	seen	within	the	context	of	a	wider	set	of	interactions	with	other	elements	of	the	system.	This	interactive	process	is	 also	 compatible	with	 the	 framework	 set	 out	 in	 figure	 3,	 as	well	 as	with	work	 in	crisis	management	that	has	long	seen	the	actions	of	the	collective	as	being	important	in	 generating	 the	 potential	 for	 failure	 (Janis,	 1982;	 Reason,	 1997;	 Turner,	 1978;	Weick,	1993).		Haslam	 et	 al’s	 (2011)	 second,	 and	 related,	 challenge	 is	 that	 we	 need	 to	 see	leadership	operating	within	 its	 situational	 context.	Of	particular	 importance	here	 is	the	 role	 that	 space	 and	 time	 can	 play	within	 a	 globalised	 organisational	 setting	 in	shaping	the	interplay	between	production	processes	and	the	harm	that	can	be	caused	arising	 from	that	(Fischbacher-Smith	&	Smith,	2015).	Again,	 this	has	synergies	with	work	on	crisis	management	 that	generally	 focussed	on	 the	performance	of	complex	
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socio-technical	 systems	 and	 especially	 where	 emergent	 conditions	 are	 seen	 as	 a	function	 of	 that	 system	 operating	 within	 space	 and	 time	 (Erikson,	 1994;	 Perrow,	1984;	Tenner,	1996).		Thirdly,	the	interactions	between	leaders	and	followers	are	seen	by	Haslam	et	al	 as	 being	 contingent	 and,	 once	 again,	 this	 is	 well	 suited	 to	 the	 holistic	 systems	approach	 that	 is	 dominant	 within	 much	 of	 the	 crisis	 management	 literature.	 In	particular,	the	challenges	that	can	be	generated	by	insider	threats	and	organisational	misbehaviours	are	important	here	(Ackroyd	&	Thompson,	1999;	Fischbacher-Smith,	2015).	These	threats	can	arise	at	multiple	levels	within	the	organisation	and	have	the	potential	to	create	crises	beyond	the	confines	of	the	host	organisation,	as	illustrated	by	 the	 actions	 of	 Edward	 Snowden,	 Bradley	 Manning,	 and	 Nick	 Leeson	 amongst	others	(Berntzen	&	Sandberg,	2014;	Brown,	2005;	Greener,	2006;	Greenwald,	2014;	Madar,	2013).			Haslam	 et	 al’s	 fourth	 issue	 relates	 to	 the	 transformative	 nature	 of	 the	leadership	 process	 and	 the	 role	 that	 inspiration	 and	 charisma	 can	 play	 in	 taking	organisational	 members	 down	 a	 particular	 strategic	 route	 (Haslam	 et	 al.,	 2011).		Whilst	 the	 concept	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 work	 of	 Weber	 and	 therefore	 has	 a	strong	 social	 element,	 it	 has	 also	 become	 embedded	 in	 the	 psychological	 theoiries	around	 leadership	 (Friedland,	 1964;	 Joosse,	 2014).	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 infamous	example	of	the	negative	aspects	of	charisma	is	that	of	Hitler	who,	though	a	range	of	actions,	 was	 able	 to	 hold	 large	 sections	 of	 the	 German	 population	 in	 his	 thrall	(Eatwell,	2006;	Lepsius,	2006;	Rees,	2012).	Charismatic	leadership	is	often	something	that	is	also	evident	in	the	aftermath	of	a	crisis	and	can	almost	provide	a	halo	effect	for	the	 individual	 almost	 irrespective	 of	 their	 actions	 (Bligh	 et	 al.,	 2004;	Hunt,	 Boal,	 &	Dodge,	1999;	Pillai,	1996).		
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The	 final	 element	outlined	by	Haslam	et	 al	 concerns	 the	need	 to	 ground	 the	leadership	work	within	an	empirical	context.	This	tends	to	prove	problematic	within	the	crisis	management	area	due	to	the	relatively	rare	nature	of	such	events	and	the	difficulties	 that	exist	 in	gaining	access	 to	organisations	 that	are	undergoing	a	crisis.	Typically,	much	of	the	work	will	be	case-driven	and	retrospective	and	should	include	some	of	the	more	negative	aspects	of	leadership	as	well	as	the	positive	attributes.				 In	 order	 to	 frame	 crisis	 leadership	 within	 the	 holistic	 setting	 advocated	 by	Haslam	et	al,	we	can	highlight	a	range	of	dark	leadership	behaviours	that	may	interact	with	 a	 range	 of	 other	 factors	 to	 generate	 a	 crisis.	 Figure	 4,	 highlights	 some	 of	 the	issues	 that	 have	 been	 identified	 as	 forming	 part	 of	 the	 darker	 aspects	 of	 the	leadership	process.	This	is	not	meant	to	be	an	inclusive	listing	but	rather	meant	to	be	illustrative	of	the	broad	spectrum	of	leadership	characteristics	that	can	impact	on	the	generation	of	crisis	conditions	within	an	organisation.		An	obvious	starting	point	here	is	with	that	wide	body	of	work	that	deals	with	the	so-called	“dark	triad”	of	narcissism,	psychopathy,	and	Machiavellianism	and	which	has	a	potential	impact	on	the	ways	in	which	organisation’s	operate	in	a	potential	“toxic	triangle”	of	 leaders,	followers,	and	environment	(Padilla	et	al.,	2007).	The	work	on	the	dark	triad	has	largely	pointed	to	the	 negative	 role	 that	 the	 interactions	 between	 these	 characteristics	 can	 play	 in	shaping	 organisational	 performance	 (Babiak	 &	 Hare,	 2006;	 Boddy,	 2011,	 2014;	Fraher,	 2014;	 Jonason	 &	 Tost,	 2010;	 Paulhus	 &	Williams,	 2002),	 although	 there	 is	partial	 evidence	 that	 points	 to	 some,	 albeit	 limited,	 positive	 aspects	 of	 those	behaviours	 (Smith	 &	 Lilienfeld,	 2013).	 	 There	 are	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 an	effective	determination	of	 some	of	 the	main	elements	of	 these	dark	behaviours	and	there	are	overlaps	that	exist	between	some	of	the	terms,	especially	those	in	the	dark	triad	(Ghaemi,	2011;	Smith	&	Lilienfeld,	2013).	Some	of	the	behaviours	identified	in	
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Figure	4	are	also	indicative	of	some	of	the	characteristics	of	the	dark	triad,	but	are	not	the	 sole	 preserve	 of	 those	 behaviours.	 One	 of	 the	 likely	 outcomes	 relating	 to	 the	interactions	between	these	behaviours	concerns	the	ways	in	which	the	organisation	deals	with	risk	and	the	provision	of	controls.			
Figure	4:	Dark	elements	of	leadership	
	
	
	(adapted	 from	 information	 in	 Lipman-Blument,	 2005;	 Pelletier,	 2010;	 Rosenthal	 &	Pittinsky,	2006)	
	 	If	organisational	leaders	do	not	see	certain	event	scenarios	as	plausible,	then	it	is	unlikely	that	they	will	put	controls	in	place	to	deal	with	them.	One	example	of	such	behaviour	can	be	found	in	a	major	bank	where	the	chief	executive	removed	all	of	the	perimeter	 protection	 vehicle	 mitigation	 from	 the	 corporate	 headquarters	 plan,	because	 he	 felt	 that	 it	 was	 expensive	 and	 ruined	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 site2.	Following	 that	 individual’s	 departure,	 the	 organisation	 had	 to	 retrofit	 protective	
                                                
2 This point was made anonymously by the head of corporate security for that particular 
bank on the understanding that the bank’s name would not be revealed.  
  Page 26 
security	 measures,	 at	 considerable	 cost,	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 potential	 threats	 from	vehicle	 borne	 improvised	 explosive	 devices	 and	 other	 potential	 threats	 to	 the	organisation’s	 security.	 	 As	 this	 individual	 was	 an	 extremely	 dominant	 leader,	 no	effective	 challenge	 to	 his	 view	 was	 made,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 clear	historical	evidence	supporting	the	use	if	VBIEDs	against	the	banking	sector	(Rodoplu	et	 al.,	 2005;	 Rogers,	 2000).	 	 One	 can	 also	 point	 to	 this	 individual’s	 habit	 of	undermining	 subordinates	 and	 his	 tendency	 towards	 displaying	 controlling	behaviours	 as	 being	 possible	 factors	 in	 both	 shaping	 this	 decision	 and	 the	 lack	 of	effective	 challenge	 by	 corporate	 security	 professionals	 within	 the	 bank.	 Another	characteristic	of	this	leader	was	the	tendency	to	recruit	and	promote	individuals	who	were	 supportive	 of	 his	 managerial	 style.	 This	 lack	 of	 leadership	 integrity	 and	nepotistic	approaches	to	recruitment	and	promotion	have	also	been	seen	as	factors	in	shaping	the	wider	organisational	culture	and	creation	of	a	sycophantic	environment	(McKenna,	 1996;	 Schütz	 &	 Bloch,	 2006;	 South	 &	 Matejka,	 1990).	 Whilst	 it	 is	 not	possible	to	generalise	from	one	example	to	a	wider	set	of	corporate	behaviours,	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	power	held	by	individuals	can	be	a	factor	in	shaping	their	behaviours	(Babiak	&	Hare,	2006;	Haslam	et	al.,	2011;	Owen,	2012).		Some	 of	 the	 work	 on	 dark	 leadership	 behaviours	 has	 focused	 on	 the	relationships	 that	 exist	 between	 those	 leadership	 traits	 and	 the	 approach	 taken	towards	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 (CSR)	 by	 the	 organisation	 (Boddy	 et	 al.,	2010a;	Boddy,	Ladyshewsky,	&	Galvin,	2010b).	At	 its	core,	CSR	is	a	reflection	of	 the	values	 that	an	organisation	places	on	key	activities	and	 it	has	been	argued	 that	 the	approaches	taken	to	CSR	can	also	result	 in	the	 incubation	of	crisis	(Tombs	&	Smith,	1995).	Again,	one	might	argue	that	many	of	the	negative	behaviours	shown	in	figure	4	would	 not	 be	 expected	 in	 an	 organisation	 that	 espouses	 a	 CSR	 approach	 to	 its	operations.	If	we	see	leadership	as	central	to	the	CSR	process,	then	the	link	between	
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the	core	beliefs,	values	and	assumptions	held	by	those	individuals	will	be	significant	factors	in	shaping	the	processes	around	crisis	incubation	and	particularly	in	terms	of	framing	the	controls	that	are	in	place	to	deal	with	potential	failures	(Tombs	&	Smith,	1995).			Figure	 5	 contextualises	 the	 dark	 elements	 identified	 in	 figure	 4	 within	 the	opening	 phases	 of	 a	 crisis	 –	 namely,	 the	 crisis	 of	management	 and	 the	 operational	crisis.	 	 These	 dark	 elements	 can	 be	 considered	 to	 shape	 the	 incubation	 phase	 of	 a	crisis	by	helping	to	create	the	pre-conditions	for	failure	and	to	undermine	attempts	at	developing	 trust,	 building	 respectful	 interaction,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 mindful	organising.	They	can	also	be	seen	to	undermine	the	capabilities	of	an	organisation	to	respond	 to	 a	 crisis	 event	 once	 the	 event	 has	 begun.	 Thus,	 at	 one	 level,	 these	 dark	characteristics	 can	contribute	 to	 the	causal	 factors	associated	with	a	 crisis	and	also	undermine	the	organisation’s	abilities	to	deal	with	the	task	demands	that	it	generates.	
	
	
Figure	5:	Dark	leadership	and	the	onset	of	crisis	
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		 Taken	 as	 a	whole,	 the	 elements	 identified	 in	 figure	 5	 represent	 the	 complex	landscape	 of	 issues	 that	 integrates	 the	 negative	 aspects	 of	 leadership	 with	 the	processes	around	the	incubation	of	failure,	through	to	the	emergence	of	and	response	to	a	crisis	event.	At	one	level,	it	is	clear	that	the	range	of	dark	behaviours	highlighted	could	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 problematic	 operating	 culture	 within	 an	organisation.	 For	 example,	 the	 domineering	 behaviours	 of	 leaders	 and	 the	undermining	of	subordinates	would	lead	to	problems	around	information	flows	and	weak	signal	detection	such	that	potential	failures	would	not	be	reported	up	the	‘chain	of	command’	within	the	organisation.	Given	that	the	identification	of	weak	signals	can	be	 problematic	 in	 organisations	 that	 function	 normally	 (Fischbacher-Smith	 &	Fischbacher-Smith,	 2014),	 then	 anything	 that	 impairs	 the	 willingness	 of	 staff	 to	report	 concerns	 will	 erode	 this	 capability	 still	 further.	 It	 is	 also	 likely	 that	 these	constraints	will	become	more	apparent	during	the	operational	phase	of	a	crisis	The	 relationships	 between	 negative	 aspects	 of	 leadership	 and	 crisis	 are	 not,	however,	clear	cut.	In	a	controversial	claim,	Ghaemi	highlights	what	could	be	seen	as	an	apparent	dichotomy	around	the	role	that	psychological	factors	can	play	within	the	processes	of	crisis	management.	His	argument	is	that:	“…in	at	least	one	vitally	important	circumstance	insanity	produces	good	results	and	 sanity	 is	 a	 problem.	 In	 times	 of	 crisis,	 we	 are	 better	 off	 being	 led	 by	mentally	ill	leaders	than	by	mentally	normal	ones”	-	(Ghaemi,	2011)	p.	2.			He	goes	on	to	state	that	the:	“Four	key	elements	of	some	mental	illnesses	–	mania	and	depression	–	appear	to	 promote	 crisis	 leadership:	 realism,	 resilience,	 empathy,	 and	 creativity”	 -	(Ghaemi,	2011)	pp.	3-4.		This	 perspective	 opens	 up	 a	 series	 of	 avenues	 for	 debate	 around	 the	 role	 that	leadership	does	play	in	crisis	and	whether	those	that	are	charged	with	managing	the	organisation	 in	 a	 steady-state	 environment	 are	 the	 best	 to	 manage	 it	 under	 crisis	
  Page 29 
conditions.	 One	might	 argue	 that	 as	 those	 charged	with	managing	 the	 organisation	prior	 to	 the	 crisis	 had	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	 incubation	 of	 failure,	 then	 they	might	not	be	best	suited	to	dealing	with	the	crisis	itself.				A	central	element	of	this	process	concerns	the	processes	by	which	leaders,	and	those	that	follow	them,	have	the	capabilities	to	deal	with	the	task	demands	associate	with	transitions	from	a	stable	state	to	a	more	complex	or	chaotic	one	and	this	remains	a	 challenge	 for	 further	 empirical	 research	 around	 the	 performance	 of	 crisis	management	 teams.	 More	 recent	 work	 has	 highlighted	 the	 positive	 benefits	 that	disorders	 such	 as	 ADHD	may	 give	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 individual’s	 capabilities	 and	 that	these	might	be	well-suited	to	the	task	demands	of	crisis	situations:	“According	to	parents,	 teachers,	and	some	researchers,	doctors	and	anthropologists,	children	 with	 ADD/ADHD	 also	 tend	 to:	 be	 free	 thinkers,	 move	 “outside	 the	 box,”	approach	problems	from	a	nonlinear	perspective,	show	heightened	abilities	to	engage	in	 synthesised	 thought,	 and	 gravitate	 towards	 a	 general	 instability	 associated	 with	creativity	“	-	(Trammell,	2014),	p.	228.		The	 abilities	 to	 function	 in	 a	 non-linear	 way	 in	 an	 organisational	 setting	 where	emergent	conditions	generate	complexity	would	be	an	attribute	that	is	well-suited	to	a	crisis	management	team.	Here	the	creativity	that	is	generated	by	such	free-thinking	individuals	would	correspond	to	the	skill	set	required	of	such	teams	(Smith,	2000a)				 What	is	evident	is	that	our	understanding	of	the	role	that	leadership	can	play	within	 a	 crisis	 is	 still	 open	 to	 debate	 but	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 interaction	 between	leadership,	followership,	and	the	environment	in	which	the	organisation	operates	are	all	key	 factors	 in	developing	 this	understanding.	There	are	 some	challenges	around	the	 role	 that	 regulation	 and	 external	 governance	 arrangements	 can	 play	 in	 the	process	of	shaping	leadership	behaviours	(Mulvey	&	Padilla,	2010)	and	this	is	also	an	issue	that	has	been	seen	as	important	within	the	crisis	management	literature	(Elliott	&	Smith,	2006;	Tombs	&	Smith,	1995;	Turner,	1978).	Thus,	the	role	of	regulation,	the	nature	 of	 the	 agencies	 involved	 in	 the	 regulatory	 process,	 and	 the	 complexity	
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generated	 by	 the	 resultant	 task	 environment	 seem	 likely	 to	 be	 areas	 where	 the	interplay	between	destructive	leadership	and	crisis	management	is	in	need	of	further	attention	(Elliott	&	Smith,	2006;	Mulvey	&	Padilla,	2010).	The	move	 away	 from	 traditional	 behavioural	models	 of	 leadership,	 in	which	the	actions	of	 leaders	 are	 evaluated	 through	 the	 lens	of	 a	 rational	 actor	model,	 has	allowed	the	transactional	and	charismatic	approaches	to	place	values,	beliefs,	and	the	emotional	aspects	of	leaders	at	the	core	of	the	leadership	process	(Yukl,	1999).	In	that	respect,	 these	approaches	 to	 leadership	have	much	 in	 common	with	work	on	 crisis	management	where	 the	 core	 beliefs,	 values,	 and	 assumptions	 of	 key	 organisational	decision-makers	 are	 seen	 to	 lie	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	development	 of	 a	 crisis	 prone	or	prepared	 culture	 (Mitroff	 et	 al.,	 1989;	Mitroff	 et	 al.,	 1988).	 Similarly,	 the	 emotional	characteristics	of	crisis	management	have	also	begun	to	attract	attention,	recognising	the	relationships	between	tacit	knowledge	and	emotion	(Sayegh	et	al.,	2004)	within	the	sensemaking	process	(Weick,	1988,	1990,	1993).	Other	work	has	focused	on	the	use	 of	 mindful	 organising	 as	 a	 means	 of	 coping	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 crisis	conditions	 (Butler	 &	 Gray,	 2006;	 Gebauer,	 2013;	 Sutcliffe,	 2011;	Weick,	 Roberts,	 &	Obstfeld,	1999).		A	particular	body	of	work	that	is	relevant	to	any	discussion	of	crisis	leadership	concerns	 the	 development	 of	what	 have	 been	 termed	 high	 reliability	 organisations	(La	 Porte,	 1996;	 Roberts,	 1990).	 High	 reliability	 organisations	 (HROs)	 are	contextualised	 as	 operating	within	 an	uncertain	 and	 emergent	 environment,	where	the	 potential	 threats	 are	 high	 (Bagnara,	 Parlangeli,	 &	 Tartaglia,	 2010).	 These	 are	organisations	 whose	 activities	 are	 rich	 in	 the	 potential	 for	 failure	 but	 which	 have	developed	ways	of	leading	and	managing	that	help	to	prevent	those	potential	failures	from	 being	 realised	 in	 practice.	 The	 task	 demands	 facing	HROs	 are	 invariably	 high	and	the	complexity	within	their	operations	invariably	prevents	the	rigid	development	
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of	 formal	 contingency	plans	 in	 an	attempt	 to	deal	with	 all	 potential	 outcomes.	This	complex	 setting	 requires	 the	 development	 of	 a	 series	 of	 dynamic	 responses	 that	operate	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 the	 organisation.	 In	 this	 context,	 HROs	 seek	 to	manage	 the	uncertainty	within	the	system	by	constantly	adapting	to	the	challenges	that	occur	at	the	local	level,	and	aim	to	do	so	without	reference	to	senior	managers.	This	process	-		one	 of	 respectful	 interaction	 (Sutcliffe,	 2011)	 –	 implies	 that	 staff	 are	 trained,	empowered,	 and	 trusted	 to	 make	 sensible	 decisions	 about	 the	 threats	 within	 the	system	and	the	actions	needed	to	deal	with	them.		As	such,			“HROs	develop	capabilities	to	detect,	contain	and	bounce	back	from	inevitable	errors	that	are	part	of	an	indeterminate	world.	The	hallmark	of	an	HRO	is	not	that	it	is	error-free	but	that	errors	do	not	disable	it”.		(Sutcliffe,	2011),	p.	137.		In	part,	the	approach	taken	to	leadership	within	the	HRO	is	allow	those	further	down	the	organisational	hierarchy	to	take	responsibility	for	managing	the	task	demands	of	the	system.	Within	such	a	context,	the	trust	between	organisational	members	is	seen	as	being	of	critical	importance	in	shaping	behaviours	(Cox,	Jones,	&	Collinson,	2006).		For	 organisations	 that	 display	 many	 of	 the	 darker	 traits	 of	 leadership,	 the	provision	 of	 trust	 is	 likely	 to	 prove	 problematic	 and	 so	 the	 elements	 of	 a	 high	reliability	approach	are	unlikely	to	exist.	Whilst	the	high	reliability	approach	has	been	criticised	 (Leveson,	Dulac,	Marais,	&	Carroll,	2009;	Sagan,	1993),	 it	does	offer	 some	potential	 for	 understanding	 processes	 around	 transformational	 leadership	 and	followership	 (Bellamy,	 Crawford,	 Marshall,	 &	 Coulter,	 2005;	 Kellerman,	 2008)	 and	especially	within	conditions	of	crisis	(Rousseau,	1989).											
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Conclusions		 	
“For	 now	 we	 see	 through	 a	 glass,	 darkly;	 ........	 now	 I	 know	 in	 part”	 -	 (1	
Corinthians	13:	12-13)			 This	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 contextualise	 the	 processes	 around	 the	 darker	aspects	 of	 leadership	 and	 to	 set	 them	 within	 a	 crisis	 management	 framework	 in	which	both	the	incubation	of	crisis	potential	as	well	as	the	actual	damaging	event	are	seen	as	an	integrated	process.	It	has	sought	to	provide	a	context	in	which	leadership	can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 a	 double-edged	 process	 that	 can,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 generate	 the	conditions	for	crisis	and,	on	the	other,	can	also	serve	to	bring	that	crisis	back	under	control.	 The	 chapter	 has	 set	 out	 some	 of	 the	 main	 theoretical	 aspects	 of	 crisis	management	as	a	means	of	using	that	theoretical	lens	to	provide	counter	perspectives	to	 the	 dominant	 heroic	 view	 of	 leadership	 under	 conditions	 of	 crisis.	 Much	 of	 the	literature	 around	 crisis	 leadership	 has	 framed	 the	 discussion	 in	 terms	 of	 the	operational	phase	of	a	crisis,	in	which	leadership	is	seen	as	an	important	element	in	the	control	of	the	event.	The	argument	developed	here	is	that	leadership	can	also	be	an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	processes	 that	 lead	 to	 the	development	of	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	first	 place.	 If	we	 fail	 to	 see	 the	 crisis	management	 process	 as	 an	 integrated	whole,	then	we	will	only	ever	develop	a	partial	understanding	of	the	role	that	leadership	can	play	within	it.		The	 chapter	 has	 outlined	 the	 importance	 of	 adopting	 a	 holistic	 approach	 to	dealing	with	both	leadership	and	the	management	of	crises.	In	particular,	a	number	of	multi-level	 and	 transformational	 processes	 are	 seen	 as	 being	 of	 importance	 in	shaping	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 damaging	 event	 and	which	 serve	 to	move	 the	 organisation	from	a	position	of	relative	order	to	a	more	chaotic	state.	These	processes	include:	the	role	 that	 leaders	 and	 senior	 managers	 play	 in	 the	 development	 of	 fractures	 in	organisational	controls;	the	manner	in	which	shifts	 in	environmental	conditions	can	
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expose	 these	 vulnerabilities;	 and	 the	 part	 played	 by	 insiders	 in	 triggering	 crises.	Leadership	actions	and	behaviours	may	also	help	to	generate	gaps	in	understanding,	control,	and	information	flows	that	are	essential	to	dealing	with	the	local	adaptations	that	 occur	 within	 organisations	 in	 response	 to	 shifts	 in	 the	 environment.	 These	adaptations	can	move	 the	organisation	 to	a	new	systems-state	 in	which	 the	control	processes	 in	 place	 are	 inadequate	 to	 deal	with	 the	 new	 set	 of	 task	 demands.	 Poor	leadership	practices	can	fail	 to	 identify	 these	gaps	by	 inhibiting	the	 identification	of	weak	 signals	 and	 early	warnings	whilst	maintaining	 the	 façade	 of	 being	 in	 control.	The	interactions	between	those	who	lead	the	organisation	and	those	who	work	at	the	operating	 core	 represent	 an	 important	 relationship	 in	 terms	 of	 shaping	 the	information	that	is	collected	and	communicated	around	early	warnings.	Whilst	leader	behaviour	is	one	part	of	that	process,	it	is	also	necessary	to	consider	the	roles	played	by	 followers	within	 the	crisis	 incubation	process.	The	 threats	generated	by	 insiders	can	also	be	damaging	and	they	may	be	a	response	to	the	behaviours	of	those	who	lead	the	 organisation.	 At	 one	 level,	 this	 can	 be	 as	 a	 result	 of	 resistance	 to	management	actions	 that	 are	 seen	 to	 be	 problematic;	 or	 it	 can	 be	 through	 the	 generation	 of	multiple	weak	links	within	the	organisation	through	weak	recruitment	practices	that	lead	to	the	promotion	of	 individuals	beyond	their	 level	of	competence.	The	complex	interplay	between	leaders	and	followers	combined	with	the	transformations	that	take	place	 under	 conditions	 of	 crisis	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 essential	 challenges	 in	 terms	 of	shaping	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 that	 leadership	 can	 play	 within	 crisis	generation	and	 response.	 In	particular,	 the	 role	 that	 leadership	 can	play	 in	 shaping	the	filtering	of	information	flows	within	the	organisation	is	an	important	aspect	of	the	incubation	process,	 and	one	 that	 is	 exacerbated	by	dark	 leadership	behaviours,	 the	generation	of	a	sycophantic	culture,	and	the	 inhibiting	of	 the	organisation’s	abilities	to	learn	from	prior	mistakes.		
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This	chapter	has	set	out	some	of	the	parameters	of	those	relationships	but	it	is	clear	that	more	work	is	required	in	order	to	fully	understand	both	the	double-edged	role	that	leadership	can	play	in	crisis	and	the	attributes	that	are	needed	to	cope	with	the	 processes	 around	 transitions	 between	 crisis	 states.	 Research	 is	 needed	 that	explores	the	role	that	leadership	theory	can	play	in	shaping	our	understanding	of	the	move	 away	 from	 an	 ordered	 systems	 state	 to	 one	 that	 is	 chaotic.	 In	 particular,	 the	ways	 in	which	 leadership	 theory	can	 inform	work	around	the	performance	of	crisis	management	 teams	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 an	 important	 area	 of	 enquiry.	 This	 research	needs	to	be	carried	out	in	real	world	settings	rather	than	in	a	laboratory	context,	and	this	remains	a	significant	challenge	for	the	academic	community	in	terms	of	access	to	organisations	prior	to	a	crisis.			A	key	challenge	 for	 leadership	 is	 the	manner	 in	which	 it	 is	 able	 to	deal	with	uncertainty.	 This	 raises	 questions	 around	 the	 role	 of	 expert	 judgements	 in	 dealing	with	 risk	 in	 complex	 socio-technical	 systems,	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 regulation	 and	governance	 shapes	 leadership	behaviours,	 and	 the	difficulties	of	managing	 complex	interactions	across	space	and	time.	The	interaction	between	knowledge	construction,	the	management	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 role	 of	 expertise	 therein,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	which	governance	can	be	enacted	within	the	context	of	crisis	management,	all	present	leadership	theory	and	practice	with	a	significant	set	of	challenges.		Finally,	 leadership	 and	 crisis	 management	 theory	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 being	potentially	 synergistic	 –	 each	 has	 a	 considerable	 amount	 to	 offer	 the	 other.	 Both	bodies	 of	 work	 adopt	 a	 transformational	 perspective	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	organisations	deal	with	uncertainty	and	how	changes	in	the	environment	can	expose	the	 weakness	 in	 controls.	 	 The	 nature	 of	 those	 transformations	 is	 such	 that	 the	challenges	that	we	face	are	ever	evolving	and	our	understanding	of	 the	 interactions	between	crises	and	leadership	processes	will	remain	incomplete	as	a	consequence.		
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Questions	for	Discussion		 1. What	does	it	mean	to	say	that	there	is	a	 ‘double-edged’	relationship	between	leaders	and	crises?	2. What	 are	 the	 benefits	 and	 limitations	 of	 viewing	 crisis	 leadership	 and	management	as	part	of	lifecycle?				
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